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Abstract
From the years 2013 and 2019, Germany witnessed the rise of a far-right
anti-immigrant party by the name of Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD). During this
timespan, AfD improved upon its previous electoral performance each time it stood for
election. AfD is now the third-largest party in the German federal parliament, or
Bundestag.
This paper tests a novel theory, focusing on the influence of print media and what
it chooses to cover. Specifically, I looked at the effects of immigration and crime
coverage on AfD’s poll numbers. Ultimately, I found no statistically discernible
correlation between crime or immigration coverage on their own and future changes in
public support for AfD. There was, however, a significant negative correlation between
coverage that combined crime and immigration and support for AfD. I hypothesize that




The test case this thesis examines is Germany from 2013 to 2019. That time
period overlaps almost perfectly with the European migrant crisis, which largely resulted
from heightened conflict in the Middle East. The wars in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq
produced millions of refugees who traveled north to Europe fleeing violence and
atrocities. Other big sources of refugees included Kosovo, Pakistan, Eritrea, and
Somalia (Frontex 2015).
Those migrants dispersed throughout Europe. A whopping 3.1 million refugees
arrived on the continent’s shores between 2015 and 2017. And 44% of them applied for
asylum in Germany, making it a disproportionate landing spot (Schaub et al. 2020, 687).
In all, Germany took in well over one million refugees during the crisis. For reference, by
the end of 2017, Germany’s refugee population was larger than that of France, Italy,
Sweden, Austria, and Greece combined (Statista 2018).
While Germany’s humanitarian efforts were lauded by the international
community, integrating and absorbing so many immigrants had its difficulties. There
were certainly short-term hits. For example, the influx of impoverished people
significantly increased the state’s financial burden (Trines 2019). Linguistic barriers also
posed a problem, though the federal government set up intensive German language
programs to address this (Brücker et al. 2019, 3).
The German far-right latched onto these challenges, arguing that Germany was
accepting more immigrants than it could handle. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), now
Germany’s third-largest party, rose to political prominence criticizing the country’s liberal
immigration policies. The party’s leaders called for a completely different approach:
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net-zero (or lower) immigration. This means a policy mandating that the number of
immigrants accepted must not exceed the number of people deported (Bierbach 2017).
Hardline proposals like that comprised a platform that ultimately won AfD 94 Bundestag
seats in the 2017 federal election.
In addition to immigration, this thesis also covers the issue of crime. Between
2013 and 2017, rates of victimization trended upward in Germany before dipping back
down in 2018 and 2019 (Eurostat 2021). The number of reported crimes also rose each
year from 2013 to 2016 (Pieper 2018). And the rate of increase far outstripped




Over the last decade, the rise of far-right political parties has emerged as a
popular research topic. Much of this scholarship has dealt with how these parties exploit
fears about immigration to garner votes (Ivarsflaten 2008; Golder 2016). Examples
abound. In my home country of the United States, former president Donald Trump
shaped his political identity around hardline anti-immigrant policies such as mass
deportations, separating migrant families, and constructing a “big, beautiful wall” across
the Southern border — which was only partially built and which Mexico definitely did not
pay for (Timm 2021).
But less has been said about why voter attitudes are often congruous with the far
Right’s xenophobia. Without the circus — his large base of supporters — Trump is just a
lonely clown. And the same goes for other right-wing authoritarian leaders and parties.
This thesis tackles that important question by examining the test case of Germany from
2013 to 2019. Those years correspond with the rise of the country’s premier
anti-immigrant party, Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD).
AfD was founded in 2013, which is the same year that they first stood for federal
election. They won 4.7% of the vote, just failing to crack the 5% threshold necessary to
win representation in the Bundestag. But AfD would not be kept out for long. Next
federal election, they improved on their performance, winning 12.6% and 94 seats. In
doing so, AfD became Germany’s third-largest political party.
And they had similar success in the European Parliament elections. In 2014, AfD
received 7.1% of the vote and a proportional seven seats. Five years later, they
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received 11% and 11 seats. What could be fueling this string of electoral successes,
each one improving on the last?
There are many possible explanations, some of which I will touch on in the
literature review. But I ultimately decided to investigate how crime coverage in the
media — with a focus on print media — creates a generalized fear that is then
weaponized against outgroups in general and immigrants in particular. Thus, the central
question I seek to answer is: How has crime coverage in print media affected
anti-immigrant sentiment (in Germany) and, as a result, support for AfD?
Khoury 10
Literature Review
There is a large collection of academic literature that seeks to explain the cause
of anti-immigrant sentiment. One popular explanation is contact theory, which is a
famous concept in psychology. It was first developed in the 1950s by an American PhD
named Gordon Allport. He said that groups interacting with one another can be a
powerful tool for promoting tolerance and acceptance.
This sounds intuitive enough. So it is no surprise that, since its introduction into
the academic sphere, many studies have produced evidence for contact theory
(DeAngelis 2001). In the context of this thesis, contact theory predicts that exposure to
immigrants will reduce prejudice against them (Williamson 2015; Vezzali and Stathi
2016).
But there are some obvious problems with this in the case of Germany from 2013
to 2019. Within that time frame, Germany took in a very large number of migrants and
refugees over a relatively short period of time. In other words, contact between natives
and immigrants must have increased. And yet the data suggests that hostility toward
immigrants increased as well.
There are many indicators of this, and AfD’s electoral success is just one.
Opinion polls are another. For example, an Ipsos poll from 2016 found that only 18% of
German respondents said that immigration is good for Germany. Meanwhile, 45% said it
is causing negative changes. And a whopping 83% of Germans polled agreed that
terrorists are pretending to be refugees and sneaking into Germany to cause “violence
and destruction.” All of these results were more extreme than those from previous
years.
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But this is the exact opposite of what contact theory would predict. In Germany,
over the past decade, more immigrants has correlated with more anti-immigrant
sentiment. So perhaps what is happening is a sort of reverse contact theory. That is,
maybe increased exposure to immigrants is actually driving hatred toward them in
Germany (and maybe even in general too).
Again, though, this appears flawed. Time and time again, AfD has proven to do
best in the German regions least affected by the recent migrant influx (Adam 2015;
Financial Times 2017; Schuetz 2017). Also, the Berlin Social Science Center tested this
very theory of reverse contact in the rural areas of eastern Germany and found null
effects: “Our measurements confirm the presence of widespread anti-immigrant
sentiments. However, these are unaffected by the presence of refugees in respondents’
hometowns: on average, we record null effects for all outcomes” (Schaub et al. 2020,
686).
Other popular explanations are based in class and socioeconomic status. One of
which says that the poor and unemployed are more likely to harbor anti-immigrant
attitudes. The theory emphasizes competition over scarce resources and can be
summed up as follows: “The lower classes disproportionately oppose immigration
because these groups are the ones most affected by the immigration process, whether
in its labor aspects (greater competition in the search for work) or in everyday
coexistence (housing and schools)” (Fetzer 2000, 7).
Studies testing this theory often rely on large-n survey data and seldom
establish anything more than a weak relationship. Although an article published in
International Sociology interestingly concluded that “the working class is more
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xenophobic when the immigrant working class is large” (Hjerm and Nagayoshia 2011,
1). This would appear to be something of a synthesis of the competition framework and
contact theory.
But the hypothesis that competition for scarce resources among the lower
classes is causing anti-immigrant sentiment is by no means bulletproof. There is a lot of
evidence to the contrary. For example, it has been observed that regions of Europe
“with a higher unemployment rate among natives… show less pronounced
anti-immigrant attitudes” (Markaki and Longhi 2013, 311). There is simply no robust
relationship between unemployment rates and xenophobic attitudes or support for
anti-immigrant political parties. And that is why some have taken to calling the
competition framework a “zombie theory” — one that will not die despite all of the
evidence against it (Miller 2018, 23).
It is worth noting that some see classism in suggesting that a lack of means and
bigotry are related. Perhaps this is compelling or perhaps it is not. Regardless, what is
more relevant is that it also appears to be false in regard to contemporary Germany.
AfD’s voter base is richer, less blue-collar, and are no more likely to be unemployed or
on welfare (Goerres et al. 2018, 259).
Another class/socioeconomic explanation is from economic anxiety. Studies have
shown that pessimism about one’s future economic standing is positively correlated with
openness to far-right ideology. And this seems to be the case across time period and
region (Kates and Tucker 2019). So perhaps it is unsurprising that a study published in
Political Communication found that economic anxiety “enhanced anti-immigrant
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attitudes among citizens across all education levels” (Schmuck and Matthes 2017, 607).
But this is far from settled (political) science.
Indeed, there is plenty of research that contradicts these findings. Clemson
University professor Steven Miller has delved into this question of whether economic
anxiety drives anti-immigrant sentiment. He did so by analyzing election surveys going
back to 1992. And Miller ultimately found no correlation whatsoever between economic
anxiety and immigration attitudes across his nearly quarter century of data.
The theory of economic anxiety driving anti-immigrant sentiment also does not fit
terribly well with what is known about the German base of far-right voters. Researchers
Michael Hansen and Jonathan Olsen found that “AfD voters [are] not driven by anxiety
about their own economic situation.” Many of them enjoy job security and high wages,
thanks in part to a union membership rate on par with that of the general population.
But anxiety can function at more than just the individual level. People can also
feel economically anxious about the general state of their region or nation. There exists
research demonstrating that racial bigotry festers when slowed economic growth is
coupled with a growing minority population (Quillian 1995).
Germany from 2013 to 2019 certainly fulfills the latter criteria. In those years,
Germany granted asylum to a huge number of refugees — most of whom we nonwhite.
It is this open-doors policy that helped earn the country a reputation of being a friendly
and welcoming place.
But the German economy actually picked up significantly between 2013 and
2019. In 2013, Germany’s GDP growth rate was just 0.44% — barely one-tenth of what
it had been only three years earlier. But, the following year, that rate rebounded to
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2.21%. And, by 2017, it had increased further still to 2.6%. However, that was then
followed by two consecutive years of decrease. Germany’s GDP growth rate dipped
down to 1.27% in 2018 and again to 0.56% in 2019 (Macrotrends).
So, while the German economy continued to grow, the rates bounced around
quite a bit. Whether Germany experienced slowed economic growth between 2013 and




Since none of the aforementioned explanations struck me as viable, I came up
with one of my own. My theory can be summed up by the following diagram:
Crime-related news stokes fear and anxiety (Riley and Peterson 2019). And,
when someone is experiencing these emotions, they are more likely to direct their
defense mechanisms toward stimuli external to what they perceive to be their in-group.
“Fear is more readily learned toward exemplars of… out-group than toward one’s own”
(Navarrete et al. 2012, 591). That breeds hostility toward outsiders — namely,
immigrants. Of course, those feelings are highly related to support for Alternative Für
Deutschland (AfD) as they are fundamentally an anti-immigrant party.
It is said that some people are naturally more susceptible to nativist and far-right
politics. Political scientist and psychologist Karen Stenner explains this at length in her
book The Authoritarian Dynamic, identifying those susceptible as having an
“authoritarian personality.” This archetype typically entails a combination of the following
traits:
● Belief in strict adherence to the letter of the law
● Aversion to ambiguity and belief in a single right way to live or act
● Strong confirmation bias and rejection of balanced information, especially
when under threat
Khoury 16
● Cognitive decline and refusal to engage when faced with diverse others
But other experts have challenged this account. Take philosopher Martha
Nussbaum, for instance. In The Monarchy of Fear, she argues that authoritarian
personality is not innate but rather is activated as a response to fear. When people are
scared, they look to an authority to control and perhaps even suppress the threat.
Unlike Stenner, Nussbaum assumes that we are all equally susceptible to this fear
response because we were all babies — and, thus, in a state of complete helplessness
— at one point.
This is a nuanced and complicated debate with strong arguments on both sides.
So it is fortunate that it does not matter who is right for the purposes of this thesis.
Whether or not it is innate, authoritarian personality can be heightened through
exposure to threats. Stenner says as much in The Authoritarian Dynamic. She notes
that it usually takes a “trigger” to activate authoritarians to take initiative and act on their
concerns. Authoritarian personalities should therefore become more visible when they
feel as though they are under threat. And that is ultimately what my research is trying to
measure.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the German press is both free and independent. In
fact, Article 5 of the German constitution reads as follows:
“Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in
speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally
acceptable sources… There shall be no censorship.”
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Moreover, newspapers like Junge Freiheit — the one I analyzed — are not
managed by the state but are instead in private hands. This made things considerably
easier as nowhere in my research or theory did I have to account for government
manipulation, bias, or suppression of the media. According to the World Press Freedom
Index, the German press is among the freest in the world. As a matter of fact, it is much
more free than the American press (World Press Freedom Index).
Junge Freiheit is Germany’s second-most popular weekly national subscription
newspaper. I originally intended to analyze the most popular one, Die Zeit, as I
assumed it would be more representative of the average German’s media consumption.
But Die Zeit rarely covers the sorts of domestic crime stories that I was looking for. So
Junge Freiheit ended up being the best available option.
Junge Freiheit mostly publishes shorter articles, typically well under 1,000 words.
Occasionally, however, the paper will publish longer-form content such as interviews
that number in the thousands of words. Junge Freiheit is very political and covers a
healthy mix of both domestic and global issues. Unsurprisingly, coverage of the
European Union — and its fiscal and immigration policies in particular — is quite
common.
Junge Freiheit’s editorial stance leans rather nationalist and conservative. That is
evident from both the op-eds that they publish and their selection of news stories.
Writers for Junge Freiheit frequently criticize Germany’s Green Party and the ruling
Christian Democratic Union. Prime Minister Angela Merkel is generally covered in an
unfavorable light. Junge Freiheit could reasonably be described as Euro-skeptical and
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are quick to latch onto stories about “left-wing extremism.” In fairness, though, Junge
Freiheit has also covered and condemned right-wing extremists and domestic terrorists.
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Methods
To measure crime coverage in German media, I randomly selected five issues of
Junge Freiheit for each year from 2013 to 2019. This involved digging into the paper’s
archives, for which a link is conveniently listed on the homepage of their official website.
For each of those 35 issues, I simply counted the number of articles about crime. That
resulted in 148 articles over the time period covered — an average of about 4.2
crime-related articles per issue.
To measure support for Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD), I gathered polling data
on vote intentions from INSA. I chose polls whose dates corresponded with the release
date of one of the selected Junge Freiheit issues. Polls have their problems and, thus,
are not perfect representations of public opinion. However, they remain the best
available way to measure voter attitudes over time.
INSA in particular has proven to be quite accurate in their measurements of the
German electorate. In their last poll before the 2017 federal election, INSA forecasted
that AfD would capture 13% of the vote; they got 12.6%. The resulting time series
consists of 35 observations, from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2019.
The variable Crime.articles represents the number of crime-related articles in a
given issue of Junge Freiheit. The variable AfD.support represents the percentage of
respondents to an INSA poll who voiced an intention to vote for AfD. Figure 1 shows
graphical depictions of these two variables of interest.
As alluded to in the literature review, it is possible that economic dynamics affect
support for AfD. So, I controlled for a potential confounder. The variable Unemployment,
which you will encounter in the analysis section, is a monthly measure of Germany’s
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national unemployment rate from a time-series dataset courtesy of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
To measure the effect of Crime.articles on AfD.support, I employed econometric
techniques. Specifically, I used a vector autoregression. Previous research has used
this technique to infer similar causal dynamics (Brandt and Williams 2007; Vliegenthart
et al. 2012).
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Figure 1. Dynamics of AfD support and crime coverage.
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Of course, it is possible that other media dynamics affect support for AfD. The
variable Immigration.articles represents the number of immigrant- or immigration-related
articles in a given issue of Junge Freiheit. In the 35 issues I analyzed, there were 209
articles of this kind. That averages to about six per issue.
Again, the effect on AfD’s poll numbers was measured through vector
autoregression. I also did this for Immigration.articles plus Crime.articles — a variable
which I labeled Crime.plus.immigration.
Lastly, some articles combined coverage of immigration and crime. They are
represented by the variable Crime.Immigration. And their effect on AfD’s poll numbers
was tested as well.
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Figure 2. Dynamics of AfD support and immigration coverage.
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Figure 3. Dynamics of AfD support and crime coverage plus immigration coverage.
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Figure 4. Dynamics of AfD support and coverage that combines crime and immigration.
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Analysis
For this thesis, I analyzed the German newspaper Junge Freiheit. It is the
second-most circulated weekly subscription newspaper in Germany and leans quite
nationalist and conservative. Junge Freiheit has been associated with the “intellectual
new right” and right-wing populist movement (Scherr 2007, 287).
My analysis concerns Junge Freiheit’s coverage of two issues: crime and
immigration. Allow me to start with the latter. Given its political tendency, how Junge
Freiheit covers immigration is unsurprising.
A lot of attention is placed on the sheer number of migrants entering Germany.
Examples of (translated) headlines include ‘Significantly more asylum seekers in
March,’ ‘Foreigners: highest increase since 1993,’ and ‘Police count more illegal
immigrants.’ The implication seems to be that Germany is being overwhelmed by
outsiders. Most of the time, this point is made implicitly using rhetoric similar to that of
the aforementioned headlines.
But the point is sometimes made explicitly as well. Article titles like ‘Attack on our
order’ and ‘Gypsies endanger the German social system’ show this. The second is
reminiscent of the economic competition framework of anti-immigrant sentiment
mentioned in the literature review. Perhaps the author was trying to convince
working-class Germans that the Roma are coming for their benefits.
Junge Freiheit’s coverage of crime, however, is less archetypal. No doubt, they
publish their fair share of right-wing talking points. Junge Freheit’s editorial stance is
decidedly pro-cop, with the police often depicted as an institution under siege. In
October of 2017, they published an article titled ‘Police officers shout for help.’ This
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image of an embattled force is similar to the one conservative outlets try to paint here in
the United States.
But Junge Freiheit’s crime coverage focuses disproportionately on political
violence. And their approach is not always so blindly partisan. While they make sure to
heap blame on the Left with headlines like ‘Left-wing are rampaging in Berlin,’ Junge
Freiheit does not ignore crimes committed by the far Right. For example, they spent
over three years covering the National Socialist Underground trial. Therein, five
neo-Nazis were prosecuted for a series of xenophobic murders committed across
Germany. This concludes a brief content analysis of Junge Freiheit.
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Now, onto a statistical analysis. Because neither variable is stationary, the vector
autoregression is estimated with first differences of each variable. Optimal lag length for
this model was determined by the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to be VAR(1).
Table 1 presents the results of a regression measuring the effect of crime articles
in Junge Freiheit on the polling numbers of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). A monthly
measure of Germany’s national unemployment rate is included as a potential
confounder, as it is possible that economic dynamics affect support for AfD too. But the
regression’s summary statistics show no statistically discernible correlation between
past changes in crime coverage and future changes in public support for AfD. The same
goes for unemployment and public support for AfD.
Table 1. Vector autoregressions, crime coverage and AfD support
- Crime.articles = number of crime-related articles in a given issue of Junge
Freiheit
- Unemployment = national unemployment rate of Germany
- AfD.support = percentage of respondents to an INSA poll who voiced an intention
to vote for AfD
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Table 2 presents the results of a regression measuring the effect of immigration
articles in Junge Freiheit on AfD’s poll numbers. Optimal lag length for this model was
determined by the AIC to be VAR(2). But the regression’s summary statistics show no
statistically discernible correlation between past changes in immigration coverage and
future changes in public support for AfD. The same goes for unemployment and public
support for AfD.
Table 2. Vector autoregressions, immigration coverage and AfD support
- Immigration.articles = the number of immigrant- or immigration-related articles in
a given issue of Junge Freiheit
- Unemployment = national unemployment rate of Germany
- AfD.support = percentage of respondents to an INSA poll who voiced an intention
to vote for AfD
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Table 3 presents the results of a regression measuring the effect of Junge
Freiheit articles combining crime and immigration on AfD’s poll numbers. Optimal lag
length for this model was determined by the AIC to be VAR(1). The regression’s
summary statistics show a statistically discernible negative correlation between past
changes in crime-immigration combo coverage and future changes in public support for
AfD at the ɑ=0.05 level.
This could be because issue ownership of crime and immigration does not favor
AfD. In other words, it might be that the average German thinks other, less conservative
parties better handle those issues. And so the increased salience of crime and
immigration may actually work to AfD’s detriment and reduce their popularity.
Table 3. Vector autoregressions, crime-immigration coverage and AfD support.
- Crime.Immigration = number of articles that combine crime and immigration in a
given issue of Junge Freiheit
- Unemployment = national unemployment rate of Germany
- AfD.support = percentage of respondents to an INSA poll who voiced an intention
to vote for AfD
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Table 4 presents results of a regression measuring the effect of crime or
immigration articles in Junge Freiheit on the polling numbers of AfD. Optimal lag length
for this model was determined by the AIC to be VAR(2). But the regression’s summary
statistics show no statistically discernible correlation between past changes in crime
coverage plus immigration coverage and future changes in public support for AfD. The
same goes for unemployment and public support for AfD.
Table 4. Vector autoregressions, crime coverage + immigration coverage and AfD
support
- Crime.plus.immigration = the number of crime and immigration articles in a given
issue of Junge Freiheit
- Unemployment = national unemployment rate of Germany
- AfD.support = percentage of respondents to an INSA poll who voiced an intention
to vote for AfD
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Conclusion
This thesis examines the influence of crime and immigration media coverage on
the popularity of Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD). That alone makes it a novel
contribution to the field of political science. Past research has tackled the question of
these specific media effects on right-wing voting in Germany. But they have not done so
in regard to AfD specifically. A paper by University of Amsterdam researchers, for
example, looked at the politically irrelevant German Republicans and National
Democratic Party of Germany.
Said researchers found no relationship between crime news and voting for either
party. They also did not find a relationship between immigration news and voting for the
National Democratic Party; however, that relationship did exist for the German
Republicans (Burscher et al. 2015, 64).
Unfortunately, though, my findings shed little light on what caused the rise of the
AfD. Crime and immigration coverage on their own were found to have no discernible
effect on AfD’s poll numbers. The same was true when crime and immigration coverage
were aggregated.
This casts doubt on the agenda-setting framework as articulated by political
scientists Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder. They theorized that media coverage has a
significant effect on what issues people care most about. And that, in theory, should shift
their voting patterns to varying extents. But the statistical tests I conducted do not
support this assumption.
A significant relationship only emerged when coverage combined the topics of
crime and immigration. But the correlation between that kind of coverage and AfD
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support was, contrary to my hypothesis, negative. This finding could be interpreted in
multiple different ways.
One potential interpretation is that issue ownership of crime and immigration
does not favor far-right parties in Germany. In other words, it might be that the average
German thinks less conservative parties better handle those issues. And so the
increased salience of crime and immigration actually works to AfD’s detriment and
reduces their popularity.
If true, this conclusion would be specific to Germany. We would expect issue
ownership to vary from country to country, as each has its own unique political climate
and culture. For example, the United States seems to differ from Germany in this way.
Stateside, it has been shown that the Right — specifically, the Republican Party
— largely owns the issue of crime. So we would expect their support to increase with
crime’s salience as a political issue (Valentino 1999). The same goes for the
immigration. Research shows that Americans who view immigration as an important
issue are more likely to support conservative policies and politicians (Knoll et al. 2011).
But that is not what I found in the case of Germany.
And this validates what has been concluded elsewhere. Concerning immigration
in particular, the aforementioned University of Amsterdam researchers wrote the
following (Burscher et al. 2015, 66):
“We thus have to raise the question whether exposure to immigration in the
media in the media can cause anti-immigrant voting, because not all voters might
advocate a decline in immigration… positions toward immigration play a role when it
comes to issue-ownership voting with a positional issue.”
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So why, unlike the Republicans, might AfD not own the issue of immigration? To
answer this important question, Prime Minister Angela Merkel and the ruling Christian
Demcratic Union’s (CDU) response to the migrant crisis must be taken into account.
Many have argued that their handling of the huge influx of immigrants spelled doom for
their political prospects. And it is true that Merkel’s approval ratings dropped
significantly during this immigration wave (though they remained high) (Armstrong
2020). But those numbers do not tell the full story.
Merkel and her CDU acolytes are cunning politicians. They did not simply
flounder in the face of an overwhelming challenge. Rather, their approach was one of
balance. As University of Basel researcher Oliver Nachtwey described in a 2017
interview with Jacobin magazine, “Merkel toughened German asylum law considerably
in the wake of the refugee crisis, but was still — by the standards of German and
international politics — seen as embodying a bit of humanity for at least leaving the
borders open.”
In doing so, the CDU was able to disarm critics from both the Right and Left. By
imposing new border controls, the ruling party made it harder for AfD to paint them as
soft on immigration. Simultaneously, their detractors from the Left struggled to depict the
CDU as inhumane or uncompassionate. Merkel’s party successfully played to both
sides of the issue, which helped them maintain widespread popularity. A 2018 poll found
that public opinion overwhelmingly favored Merkel’s approach to the migrant crisis
(Duncan 2018). And this confidence in the CDU allowed them to preserve their rule by
comfortably winning subsequent elections.
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As for crime, perhaps AfD does not own that issue because Germans do not
naturally connect it to immigrants as I predicted they would. Because, if Germans made
that connection instinctually, crime coverage would likely push them into the arms of a
party that is restrictionist on immigration like AfD. But this is not what I observed. Maybe
Junge Freiheit was trying to make the connection on Germans’ behalf when publishing
articles combining crime and immigration.
It might also be that Germany is somewhat immune to pressures, like crime and
immigration, that typically boost the far Right. This is a real possibility because "these
pressures themselves do not create success” (Art 2007, 334). Political cultures matter
too. And Germany’s is one wherein, “[d]ue to Germany’s history of the ‘Third Reich’, all
new parties on the political right are automatically stigmatised as heirs of National
Socialism” (Berbuir et al. 2014, 7). That might neutralize factors which tend to increase
support for reactionary politics.
To conclude this thesis, I would like to propose some ideas for future research.
While I am proud of my work, there is certainly more to be done. No study, thesis, or
research paper is ever the final word on a topic. Even if authored by the most brilliant
scholar — which I certainly am not — there is always more to be said. That is what
makes political science fun.
If I had more time and resources, I would have analyzed a greater number of
newspapers to get a more representative sample of German media consumption. Junge
Freiheit is popular, but it is only one of many papers. It also leans quite nationalist and
conservative — political tendencies that much of the German populace does not identify
with.
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By only examining Junge Freiheit, I left out many popular newspapers that
represent other areas of the political spectrum. For example, Die Zeit is Germany’s
most-circulated national subscription paper and typically publishes more centrist views.
Papers like Die Tageszeitung and Junge Welt, on the other hand, represent the Left with
some referring to the latter as Marxist.
And there are even right-leaning papers that are more moderate in their tone
than Junge Freiheit. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt come to mind, just to
name a few. But there are many others.
It makes sense that moderate conservatism would be well-represented in
German media considering the country has been ruled by a center-right party for the
last 16 years and counting. The CDU is a force to be reckoned with in German politics.
And they will, barring the unexpected, hold onto their dominant position following the
federal election this September.
Ideally, I would also go beyond Germany entirely and examine other countries. It
is possible that my test case for this thesis was an outlier. In other words, my theory
about crime coverage stoking fear which causes anti-immigrant sentiment may be
correct generally but just so happened to be false for Germany from 2013 to 2019.
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